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EU climate diplomacy vis-à-vis Australia, Brazil and  
Mexico: engaging difficult partners to enhance global 
ambition 
Bram De Botselier 
The European Union (EU) played an important role during 
the negotiations of the Paris Agreement and in particular at 
the 2015 Paris climate summit (COP-21). The EU’s success in 
Paris was largely due to an adjusted climate diplomacy strat-
egy following the largely unsuccessful 2009 Copenhagen cli-
mate summit (COP-15). Not only did the EU move away from 
its outlier positions, it also considerably changed its out-
reach in the run-up to COP-21. The bloc’s Climate Action 
Commissioner Miguel Arias Cañete embarked on a world 
tour to seek support from a group of over 100 like-minded 
countries for a comprehensive, global agreement. This 
group would later form the High Ambition Coalition (HAC), 
and would eventually also convince less ambitious govern-
ments to agree to the Paris Agreement. Since then, the po-
litical situation has changed significantly, posing a particular 
challenge for the preparatory negotiations for the Decem-
ber 2019 COP-25 organised in Santiago, Chile. This summit 
will be key to maintaining the level of ambition agreed upon 
in the Paris Agreement, especially since countries should en-
hance their Nationally Determined Contributions (NDC) in 
2020. COP-25 will thus be a major milestone for keeping the 
‘spirit of Paris’ alive. 
Political changes have affected numerous key countries. The 
most discussed one concerns the election of US President 
Donald Trump and his announcement, in June 2017, to with-
draw the US from the Paris Agreement (e.g., De Botselier 
2018). In the wake of this major change with potential reper-
cussions for the viability of the Paris Agreement , the posi-
tions of – and EU relations with – other major emitters, espe-
cially China and India, have also been widely debated, as has 
the case of Canada as a – under Trudeau – progressive indus-
trialized country (e.g., Belis et al. 2018; Green & Turner 2018).  
This policy brief therefore focuses on three other countries 
that arguably played important roles in broadening support 
for an agreement during COP-21, namely Australia, Brazil and 
Mexico. As the world’s 14th, 12th and 13th biggest emitter re-
spectively, they are jointly responsible for about 5% of global 
emissions. Additionally, Australia has the eight highest score 
Executive Summary 
> Support from Australia, Brazil and Mexico was 
key for the adoption of the 2015 Paris Agree-
ment on Climate Change. All three countries are 
among the top 15 global emitters, and are cen-
tral players inside their negotiation coalitions 
within the United Nations climate regime. 
> Since 2015, national governments with less cli-
mate-friendly agendas have come to power in 
these countries. In the run-up to the 2019 COP-
25 in Santiago de Chile, which represents a last 
major opportunity to discuss enhanced ambi-
tion prior to the submission of parties’ Nation-
ally Determined Contribution in 2020, it is im-
portant that these countries remain committed 
to the global negotiation process. 
> To ensure that they do remain committed, the 
European Union’s climate diplomacy should: 
> engage with national governments on some 
key areas which they are still open to, such 
as renewable energy in Australia and Brazil 
and positive spill-overs of public-private co-
operation in Mexico; 
> interact with sub-national governments, 
which have now often only rhetorically com-
mitted to combatting climate change, but 
lack the capacity to turn these into concrete 
policy measures. 
>  
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for emissions per capita (JRC 2017). Each of them is an im-
portant member of a major negotiation group in the United 
Nations (UN) climate regime: the Umbrella Group (Australia), 
BASIC (Brazil, South Africa, India and China) and the Environ-
mental Integrity Group (Mexico). As such, their approach to 
the negotiations will be essential to the success of COP-25. 
The policy brief provides, per country, a brief overview of 
their historical role in climate governance, then assesses their 
current policies and finally identifies possible actors, instru-
ments and concrete issues that could be used by the EU vis-
à-vis each of these countries to design  a comprehensive cli-
mate diplomacy strategy ahead of COP-25. Currently, these 
countries are not explicitly addressed in the EU’s Climate Di-
plomacy strategies. The policy brief argues that the EU’s strat-
egy should focus on engaging with national governments on 
some key areas that they are still open to while also interact-
ing with sub-national governments. These latter have often 
committed to combatting climate change, but regularly lack 
the capacity to turn their commitments into concrete policy 
measures. 
Australia: still not warming up to climate policy 
As part of the Umbrella Group, Australia has for long teamed 
up with industrialized countries as Canada, Japan, New Zea-
land, Russia, and – mainly – the US. Traditionally, Australia’s 
position is closely aligned with the latter’s: it is also rather 
hesitant to commit to strict climate targets in international 
negotiations, but lets the US take the lead in voicing the con-
cerns of the Umbrella Group. After having ousted climate 
sceptic Prime Minister Tony Abbott only a few months earlier, 
then Australian leader Malcolm Turnbull was keen for Aus-
tralia to take on a more leading role during COP-21. A long-
term proponent of climate measures, Turnbull had in 2009 
even lost the leadership of his party over his support for an 
emissions trading scheme. Despite Turnbull’s personal stance 
towards the issue and even though there was a clear momen-
tum to break with his predecessor’s policies, Australia 
showed only lukewarm support for the HAC at COP-21 – join-
ing only after its absence caused public outrage (Taylor 2015). 
Australia’s position during the conference was rather em-
blematic for its general approach towards the issue: climate 
and environment are contentious topics, and a much-needed 
long-term policy is hard to develop considering Australia’s 
volatile political system with frequent government changes. 
Ahead of COP-25, several major changes have occurred: 
Turnbull lost the premiership to intra-party challenger Scott 
Morrison. Among other policy initiatives, the new premier 
decided to cancel payments to the Green Climate Fund. De-
spite increased attention for climate policy as well as addi-
tional pressure from thousands of schoolchildren who have 
been participating in climate demonstrations in recent 
months, Morrison was confirmed in office during the May 
2019 Australian federal election. It is therefore quite unlikely 
that any significant changes will be made to Australia’s cli-
mate legislation and policies. On the one hand, Morrison 
stated during the election campaign that he intends to re-
spect Australia’s commitments under the Paris Agreement. 
He aims to achieve its greenhouse gas (GHG) emission reduc-
tion targets by making use of carry-over carbon credits from 
the Kyoto Protocol and by investing in renewable energy, par-
ticularly focused on Snowy Hydro, a set of hydro-electric 
power stations and dams. On the other hand, Morrison in-
tends to abolish the National Energy Guarantee, a scheme set 
up by the Turnbull government that forced Australia’s 140 
biggest companies to reduce their GHG emissions, without 
offering a clear alternative (Belot 2019). This will not suffice 
for Australia to meet its NDC (Climate Action Tracker 2019). 
In addition to the federal government, climate action is also 
taken on the regional level. For example, Australian Capital 
Territory, Queensland, South Australia and Victoria have 
signed up to the Under2 Coalition, a group of subnational 
governments that have committed to lay down mitigation 
plans to limit global warming to 2°C. The latter three states – 
together covering more than half of Australia’s population – 
have also in practice shown an interest in developing climate-
friendly policies and have made considerable investments in 
renewable energy. These local actions can have clear bene-
fits, as shown by South Australia, which has moved from an 
energy importer to a net exporter (Graham 2018). 
The EU’s climate-related engagement with Australia needs to 
target all levels of government. Although the national govern-
ment may not be particularly keen on adopting stricter na-
tional or international climate policies and targets, Morri-
son’s interest in investing in renewable energy should be en-
couraged by the EU. This could be done by mainstreaming cli-
mate objectives in other policies, and trade in particular. Last 
year, the Council of the EU approved the mandate to start 
negotiations on a free trade agreement (FTA). Certain conces-
sions on the EU’s side could be made conditional upon Aus-
tralia enhancing its level of climate ambition. Furthermore, 
the EU should also engage with regional actors so that more 
states and territories follow South Australia’s example. There 
are several initiatives the EU can play a role on, such as 
Queensland’s current grappling with the Carmichael coal 
mine. Envisaged as one of the biggest coal mines in the world, 
extracting low quality and heavily polluting coal, the mine 
could pose risks to the Great Barrier Reef and the local 
groundwater, and is also incompatible with the measures 
needed to limit global warming to the Paris target of 2°C 
(ibid.). The global impact of this project could warrant at least 
some degree of engagement by the EU Delegation or the 
Commission’s Directorate-General (DG) for Climate Action 
vis-à-vis local policy-makers. Additionally, also the networks 
of member states present in Australia can be used, especially 
of those who are particularly active on climate change (see 
Torney & Cross 2018). The United Kingdom (UK), for instance, 
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has good ties with Australia, for instance through the Com-
monwealth of Nations, and has a well-developed climate di-
plomacy. It seems likely that also after Brexit, the UK’s ap-
proach to international climate negotiations will remain 
closely aligned with the EU’s. Also, Germany conducts several 
projects in Australia through the German International Cli-
mate Initiative. Member states that are already active could 
reorient their existing projects to specifically target individual 
states, or focus their efforts on the renewable energy and hy-
dropower in particular, since the Morrison government is the 
most open towards these issues.  
Brazil: how to deal with South America’s Trump 
In the late 2000s, Brazil joined forces with its BASIC allies in 
what was seen as a successful strategy to block significant 
progress during COP-15. Back then led by socialist President 
Lula da Silva, Brazil had embarked on a successful journey to 
combat deforestation – one of the country’s major sources of 
GHG emissions – but it was not (yet) willing to contribute to 
a similarly progressive climate policy internationally, which it 
saw mainly as the responsibility of industrialized countries. In 
Paris, however, Brazil changed course and under President 
Dilma Rousseff joined the HAC shortly before the end of the 
conference, teaming up with developing countries and the 
European Union to push for an ambitious global climate pact. 
Its breaking away from BASIC allies was widely perceived as a 
pivotal development during COP-21 and gave the HAC clear 
momentum (Arias Cañete 2015).  
The country’s role is bound to change significantly though un-
der the presidency of climate-sceptic President Jair Bolso-
naro, who was elected on a wave of discontent after years of 
political crisis and accusations of corruption against some of 
the country’s top politicians. Bolsonaro has not (yet) initiated 
the withdrawal process from the Paris Agreement. However, 
he refused to host COP-25 and seems unlikely to respect Bra-
zil’s GHG reduction commitments – let alone support stricter 
targets. Particularly worrying is Bolsonaro’s support for the 
economic development of parts of the Amazon rainforest by 
removing environmental protection mechanisms and open-
ing it up to agriculture, forestry and mining. As one of his first 
decisions, Bolsonaro shifted the competence to create indig-
enous reserves (many of which are in the Amazon rainforest) 
from the National Indian Foundation agency to the Ministry 
of Agriculture (Viscidi & Graham 2019). This could not only 
significantly increase Brazil’s carbon footprint, but also have 
negative consequences for global climate regulation and the 
world’s biodiversity.  
In federal Brazil, sub-national actors also play a role in climate 
policies. While most Brazilian states and municipalities do not 
have well-developed policies in place, their impact should not 
be underestimated. For example, the City of São Paulo was in 
2009 the first administration in Brazil to adopt GHG reduction 
targets, which in turn influenced São Paulo State and eventu-
ally led the federal government to do the same. Between 
2011 and 2014,  Belo Horizonte, Feira de Santana, Recife and 
Rio de Janeiro have also adopted similar comprehensive pol-
icies, often encompassing both adaptation and mitigation 
measures. Additionally, Amazonas was in 2007 the first state 
to adopt a climate policy, and now about half of Brazil’s 27 
states have plans in place (Barbi & da Costa Ferreira 2017). 
The states of Acre, Amazonas, Mato Grosso, Pernambuco, Rio 
de Janeiro, Rondônia, São Paulo, Tocantins as well as São 
Paulo City have also signed up to the Under2 Coalition. 
Although the Bolsonaro administration will not be the most 
keen to engage with the EU on climate change, it can still be 
targeted regarding some specific policy issues. First, Bolso-
naro entertains close ties to the agricultural sector and has 
consequently been an ardent supporter of the biofuel indus-
try (Viscidi & Graham 2019). The EU should engage in discus-
sions on these issues as it will be particularly important that 
biofuels are promoted through technological improvements 
and efficiency gains rather than using new land, which would 
negatively impact the Amazon rainforest. Second, as job cre-
ation is one of Bolsonaro’s priorities, new employment can 
come from Brazil’s emerging electric car industry. Chinese car 
manufacturer BYD has started to produce battery cells and 
solar panels as well as assemble electric cars and busses in 
Brazil (Xinhua 2015). EU companies should equally be encour-
aged to contribute to this development and start invest-
ments. Third, Bolsonaro has been in favour of investing in re-
newable energy, such as solar and wind, in order to reduce 
dependence on (imported) coal and oil. Although he has been 
relatively silent on the specifics of his plans, this represents 
an area where the EU could apply some pressure (Viscidi & 
Graham 2019). The EU, through coordination between DGs 
TRADE, CLIMA and ENV, could for example link these environ-
mental concerns to the negotiations of the EU-Mercosur FTA, 
which Bolsonaro supports and which have been reinvigorated 
recently (Gamarski 2019). 
Additionally, the EU should also engage with subnational gov-
ernments. The local EU Delegation, in coordination with DGs 
CLIMA and ENV, can specifically play a role by sharing experi-
ences and technology adapted to the needs of each individual 
level of government. States to be focused on in particular, es-
pecially regarding measures to cut GHG emissions, are Minas 
Gerais, Rio de Janeiro and São Paulo, which together account 
for half of Brazil’s Gross Domestic Product. Furthermore, Am-
azon states could be particularly targeted regarding land use 
change policy and sustainable forestry (Barbi & da Costa Fer-
reira 2017). EU member states could reorient their already 
existing programmes, such as Germany’s International Cli-
mate Initiative, away from cooperating with the federal ad-
ministration and work together with regional governments 
instead. 
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Engaging with the Bolsonaro administration on some specific 
issues while helping Brazil’s lower levels of government in-
crease their climate ambition can at least somewhat mitigate 
the impact of the federal administration’s overall lack of en-
thusiasm for climate policies. 
Mexico: from driving force to climate laggard? 
Mexico’s contribution to international climate politics cannot 
be underestimated. As a member of the Environmental Integ-
rity Group, it is a key country in the climate negotiation group 
that was founded with the intention to transcend the differ-
ences between emerging economies and developed coun-
tries. Furthermore, Mexico’s presidency of COP-16 in Cancún 
was widely acclaimed for its transparency, which restored the 
trust between the negotiation parties following COP-15 (Park 
2016). Joining the HAC in Paris, Mexico played an important 
role at COP-21 and thereafter. Additionally, it has successfully 
pursued regional cooperation with Canada and reached out 
to like-minded US states in an attempt to increase ambition 
but also to compensate for the non-action on the US federal 
level under the Trump administration (Taraska et al. 2018).  
Nevertheless, Mexico’s driving role has come under pressure 
since the July 2018 election of President Andrés Manuel 
López Obrador (AMLO). His administration has delayed the 
retirement of several fossil fuel-powered plants and allocated 
funds for their modernisation at the expense of a successful 
renewable energy project. The 2019 budget foresees funds to 
support hydropower, but this does not compensate for the 
cuts made to other renewable energy projects. Moreover, 
the government cancelled the most recent rounds of the 
long-term electricity auction, which was one of the main in-
struments put in place for Mexico to attain its clean energy 
targets, and had previously proven successful in freeing pri-
vate-sector money for green power. So far, it has not been 
replaced by any alternative. This has made it unlikely that 
Mexico will achieve its NDCs, which had already been judged 
as insufficient to limit global warming to 2°C (Climate Action 
Tracker 2019).  
At the sub-national level, Mexican states are active in climate 
policy. The states of Aguascalientes, Baja California, Baja Cal-
ifornia Sur, Chiapas, Colima, Hidalgo, Jalisco, Mexico State, 
Michoacán, Oaxaca, Querétaro, Quintana Roo, Sonora, Ta-
basco and Yucatán, as well as Mexico City have joined the Un-
der2 Coalition. Under the auspices of the Mexican chapter of 
the World Wide Fund for Nature (WWF) and the city of Gua-
dalajara, the Alianza para la Acción Climática was created, a 
platform of businesses, local governments and universities 
that have committed to addressing climate change. The Ali-
anza has also teamed up internationally and set up coopera-
tion mechanisms with counterparts in Japan and the United 
States (WWF 2019). Nevertheless, the commitments made by 
Mexico’s subnational levels of government often remain rhe-
torical and lack a practical plan or successful implementation.  
This may provide a window of opportunity for the EU. By 
sharing specific examples of climate policies with regional 
governments, lessons and best practices from the EU could 
serve as a basis for concrete action. This would strengthen 
the pro-climate forces in Mexico and put pressure on the fed-
eral government to (re)consider the impacts of its policies on 
the country’s NDC. The EU could also directly engage with the 
federal level. At the basis of López Obrador’s policies lies an 
attempt to combat corruption, fuelled by a mistrust of the 
close ties between business and Mexican politics, as well as 
his focus on developing social programmes, such as limiting 
electricity costs. While these intentions per se are undoubt-
edly laudable, they could arguably be achieved by other 
means – and this is where the EU could play a role.  
First of all, the FTA concluded last year stipulates that both 
the EU and Mexico have to live up to their commitments un-
der the Paris Agreement. As such, the EU (meaning DG 
TRADE) has an obvious stick it could use to point out Mexico’s 
obligations. At the same time, the FTA includes a provision on 
the “promotion of low-carbon technologies and energy effi-
ciency” (DG TRADE 2018). This could be complemented by a 
public relations exercise to promote already successful exam-
ples of public-private cooperation on climate policies, draw-
ing on successful examples in Mexico. For instance, Ger-
many’s development agency GIZ and its International Climate 
Initiative have supported private sector GHG emission reduc-
tion efforts by issuing green bonds, and the UK’s International 
Climate Fund has financed technical assistance programmes 
to make private financing more attractive. 
Conclusion: what strategy for the EU ahead of COP-25? 
The global political landscape has clearly changed signifi-
cantly since COP-21 adopted the Paris Agreement, making it 
more challenging for the EU to ensure that the negotiations 
at COP-25 remain on track to enhance ambition during the 
2020 revision of the NDCs. Nevertheless, after analysing the 
political situation in some key countries, this policy brief con-
cludes that there is a way forward also with Australia, Brazil 
and Mexico to preserve the spirit of Paris in Santiago – if the 
EU thinks strategically about who to target, what approach to 
use and how to engage with these partners.  
First, the EU should be strategic in the actors it engages with 
and the topics it touches upon. Even less climate-friendly gov-
ernments can be involved in the discussions on enhanced am-
bition if they are targeted in a tailor-made manner. For exam-
ple, Australia’s Morrison supports hydroelectric power, Bra-
zil’s Bolsonaro has a genuine interest in biofuels and Mexico’s 
López Obrador could be convinced to support private-sector 
investments in renewable energy as long as they do not lead 
to inappropriate involvement of businesses in public affairs. 
Additionally, there is a clear room for manoeuvre regarding 
subnational entities, which provides a window of opportunity 
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that should be used effectively to compensate for the na-
tional governments’ lack of interest in climate policies. While 
there are numerous examples of states, regions and cities 
that have approved and implemented comprehensive plans 
to cut GHG or invest in renewables, many have only commit-
ted rhetorically to combat climate change. The EU should en-
gage with these subnational actors, share best practices and 
encourage them to come up with concrete proposals. Action 
by subnational governments can not only mitigate non-action 
on the national level, but also contribute to climate change 
staying on public and political agendas, which is important to 
ensure that the entire country eventually remains at the in-
ternational climate negotiation table. 
Second, the EU should use all assets at its disposal in its ap-
proach to push for higher ambition, and its main selling point 
is arguably its status as the world’s largest economy. The 
mainstreaming of climate concerns in trade policies therefore 
provides for a promising window of opportunity. The EU is 
negotiating FTAs with Australia and Brazil (as part of Mer-
cosur) and could make certain trade concessions conditional 
upon including provisions regarding climate ambition, such as 
respecting commitments made under the Paris Agreement. 
In cases where such provisions already exist, such as the EU-
Mexico FTA, they could be used to remind current govern-
ments of their responsibilities. Other provisions can be in-
cluded to set up exchanges on the promotion of green tech-
nologies or energy efficiencies, as is also the case with the EU-
Mexico FTA. Furthermore, the EU’s approach can also build 
on activities from the member states. Some are particularly 
active on climate change and have well-developed pro-
grammes in place, such as Germany’s International Climate 
Initiative. Some of these already existing partnerships can be 
reoriented to include sub-national actors, especially those in 
policy areas where the national government lacks interest. 
Additionally, projects with national governments could be de-
signed to focus especially on those areas in which current ad-
ministrations are interested. Successful existing activities can 
be promoted through public diplomacy, which can eventually 
convince the federal governments of the benefits of, e.g., 
public-private partnerships – or at least keep the debate on 
the national political agenda. 
Third, the EU should engage with these partners by involving 
a multitude of actors on the EU’s side, on different levels. 
Mainstreaming of climate change in trade policy will require 
a large role for DG TRADE, in coordination with DGs CLIMA 
and ENV. Additionally, the Green Diplomacy Network (GDN) 
is an instrument the EU could use for this purpose, especially 
as Australia, Brazil and Mexico are priority partners within 
this framework (Torney & Cross 2018). The GDN was created 
to mainstream environmental policy in EU external action, 
and to coordinate engagement by the Commission and mem-
ber states more efficiently. While the Council of the EU 
launched the GDN, its specific set-up in third countries is 
largely organized ad hoc. Nevertheless, it is usually the EU 
Delegation taking the leading role, with France, Germany, the 
Netherlands and the UK also spending significant resources 
on environmental diplomacy. In practice, however, few EU 
Delegations have a specific climate/environment/energy at-
taché (Australia, Canada, China and India being the main ex-
ceptions), and even those diplomats often also have other 
topics they are responsible for. In most countries, it is a trade 
or development staffer who is, in addition to his/her main du-
ties, also the focal point for climate change (ibid.). This argu-
ably leaves little time to strategize which issues the EU should 
be active on, and on which political level it should pursue its 
objectives. A solution to this staff problem could be to dis-
patch a (semi-)permanent DG CLIMA official to EU Delega-
tions to focus especially on subnational governments. This 
could be particularly useful in regions where many subna-
tional governments are active, and where there is significant 
intra-regional cooperation, such as in North America.  
Additionally, this more technical level of cooperation should 
be complemented by engagement on a political level, espe-
cially once the new European Commission is in place. For in-
stance, after President Trump announced the US withdrawal 
from the Paris Agreement, then California Governor Jerry 
Brown was received by numerous EU officials, from Climate 
Action Commissioner Cañete to European Parliament Presi-
dent Tajani. This gave momentum to coalitions of states (e.g., 
the US Climate Coalition) and businesses/cities (e.g., ‘We Are 
Still In’) in the US to keep the national, public debate on cli-
mate change policy alive – despite the Trump administra-
tion’s climate scepticism. This example indicates a potential 
for engagement that could be replicated in other countries. 
Although not in the same league as the top emitters China, 
India and the US, Australia, Brazil and Mexico are key players 
in global climate negotiations, which merit explicit attention 
by EU climate diplomats. By using the proposed combination 
of targeting specific actors in these countries, making use of 
existing policies and mainstreaming climate in trade policy as 
well as involving a wide range of actors on the EU’s side, the 
EU will be well prepared to become once again a key player 
at COP-25 in Santiago, as well as to keep the spirit of the Paris 
Agreement alive ahead of 2020 when parties are bound to 
enhance their NDCs. 
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